N ot everyone welcomes the entrance o f H M Os into the Medicaid program, however. Critics o f M edicaid H M O s maintain that man datory H M O enrollment greatly lim its beneficiaries' choice of phy sicians and that since H M O s are a small part of the American health care system, this forces beneficiaries out o f the mainstream. This concern has led federal law to treat mandatory H M O enrollment for Medicaid beneficiaries as a special case. A state that makes HM O enrollment mandatory for its M edicaid beneficiaries must obtain an exemption, called a waiver, from the Health Care Financing Adm in istration. A state that does not contract with HM Os for its Medicaid program-thereby, in effect, requiring its Medicaid beneficiaries to participate in the fee-for-service sector-needs no exemption. This differential treatment of fee-for-service and HM O sectors is based on the belief that a mandatory H M O system runs the danger of sub stantially reducing beneficiaries' freedom of choice of physician and site of care.
To date there has been little effort to subm it to any empirical test the belief that mandatory H M O s restrict freedom of choice. It is a very policy-relevant issue, however, because of the potential advantages of the H M O form o f medical care delivery. If it can be shown that mandatory H M O enrollment does not unduly restrict freedom of choice, a major argument against Medicaid HM O expansion will have been removed. The data available to perform such a test are limited, but they are adequate to begin the task. This is the objective o f our article. The first section sets the frame work for the discussion by briefly reviewing the history of Medicaid H M Os, recent changes in the H M O industry, and the reasons why major expansion o f Medicaid H M O s is unlikely unless enrollment is mandatory. 
H istory
For many years the perception of Medicaid HM Os was determined by the M edicaid scandals in California in the early 1970s, and this legacy is still with us, whether justified or not. In 1972 California enacted legislation allowing the state to contract with HM Os-called prepaid health plans-for comprehensive care of its Medicaid popu lation. Beyond requiring the plans to be less costly than fee for service, the legislation placed little control on the organizations with which the state contracted. The same legislation embodied an incentive for Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in H M O s by imposing copayment requirements on enrollees remaining in the fee-for-service sector. The goal of the program was for one million Medicaid eligibles to enroll voluntarily in such plans by the end o f 1974.
The number o f plans expanded from 21 in 1972 to 54 in 1974. The number of enrollees grew from 148,000 in 1972 to 252,000 in 1974. Even though the enrollment target was not reached, this rapid growth, combined with a lack o f operating controls, led to a number of serious problems that have been well documented in congressional hearings and in scholarly articles (e .g ., Chavkin and Treseder 1977) . The state set no criteria for contracts subm itted, failed to monitor the quality o f care rendered, set no standards on the number of providers in an area, and incorrectly estimated payment rates. Con sumers complained about unethical marketing tactics and denial of care. The prepaid health plans, for their part, had excessive admin istrative costs and profits, failed to keep proper records o f utilization, and did not establish grievance and disenrollment procedures.
These problems led to a public outcry which was widely covered in the media. In 1973 California passed the Waxman-Dufify act, which (1) set marketing standards, (2) prohibited the H M O s from having a majority o f their enrollment being from M edicaid, and (3) required public hearings for any potential contract. These regulations were insufficient to bring the situation under control, however, in large part because o f poor administration. In 1975 a new governor put a moratorium on H M O contracts.
The Medi-Cal scandals made an impression on federal policy makers. This legislation produced much experimentation and stimulated seven states to set up mandatory H M O enrollment for at least some areas in the state. In 1982 when Arizona became the last state to participate in the M edicaid program , it required all beneficiaries to enroll in H M O s. The program had serious administrative problems for the first two years. Under a new director, however, these have been corrected. Relative to traditional M edicaid programs, it is cheaper (Trapnell et al. 1986 ) and may have a better quality-assurance program (Schaller, Bostrom , and Rafferty 1986) .
In portions o f six other states, M edicaid beneficiaries are also re quired to enroll in H M O s. The M edicaid competition demonstration has sites in four states: Santa Barbara, California; Kansas City, M is souri; Monroe County, New York; and three counties in Minnesota (Hurley 1986 
T h e C h a n g in g H M O Industry
When most people think o f an H M O , they think o f any capitated program. In fact, there are at least three distinct forms. The first is the prepaid group practice (PGP), typified by Kaiser. PGPs provide medical services only at designated clinics. Most of their physicians are employed full time by the PG P, and consumers m ust switch their physician in order to enroll. The second is the individual practice association (IPA). Its defining characteristic is that its physicians maintain their own offices and can continue to have fee-for-service patients as well as patients who come under the group's capitation scheme. In essence, the PG P is much more o f a unitary organization, whereas the IPA has two very separate parts: the administrative or insuring arm, and the providers (individual physicians or small groups of physicians This growth o f IPAs blurs the line between H M O and fee for service. U pon joining an IPA , physicians continue to practice in their offices and see the same patients. A physician can bring his patients with him when he or she joins, and a consumer can generally enroll in an IPA without switching physician. This flexibility is a major reason for the growth o f IPAs.
Another reason for their growth is that utilization rates o f IPAs, which used to be above those o f traditional H M O s, are now com mensurate with rates in traditional H M O s. Most IPAs are giving their physicians financial incentives to control costs. These incentives, probably in conjunction with utilization review and other mechanisms, have resulted in a drop in hospital days per 1,000 enrollees, such that the performance o f these modern IPAs is similar to that of traditional H M O s (W elch 1987) . (This drop in utilization does not appear to be due to differential health status, since IPA enrollees have roughly the same level o f health expenditure prior to enrollment as nonenrollees [W elch 1988] .) W e should note that the incentives to underutilize are stronger in modern IPAs than in traditional H M O s. This may have adverse im plications for quality o f care in the absence o f safeguards. In an evaluation o f the W isconsin M edicaid H M O program, for example, traditional H M O s were found to have higher quality o f care than IPAs (Schramm et al. 1986, 40) . The quality o f care in IPAs should be further investigated.
I f this growth o f IPAs continues, the line between fee-for-service physicians and H M O physicians will be increasingly blurred. In some parts o f the country, the two groups are already overlapping to a substantial degree. For instance, one-half o f all physicians in California participate in an H M O (California Medical Association Bureau of Research and Planning 1986) . To the extent that California is a bellwether, there may soon be little distinction between fee-for-service and H M O physicians.
T h e Im portance o f M a n d a tory E n rollm en t I f M e d ic a id H M O s A r e to E x p a n d
When facing a choice between fee-for-service medicine and HM Os, the nonpoor have an incentive to enroll in H M Os because HM Os can offer enrollees lower health care cost and wider coverage that com pensate for some restrictions on choice. The restrictions are greater for traditional H M O s, whose physicians are typically full-time em ployees, than for IPAs, as noted above.
The M edicaid poor do not generally have an incentive to enroll because the disadvantages o f H M O s are not compensated for Medicaid beneficiaries by lower cost or wider coverage (Ashcraft and Berki 1983; Anderson and Fox 1987 Under mandatory enrollment o f beneficiaries, the H M O market share o f the M edicaid market is, by definition, close to 100 percent. If M edicaid saves a fixed amount per beneficiary regardless of the proportion o f beneficiaries that enroll, then even the most successful voluntary enrollment programs now yield savings which are onequarter of what would be saved if the programs were mandatory. In reality, at low levels o f H M O penetration the savings are likely to be less than proportional due to higher administrative costs and pos sible adverse selection from enrollment by people with reason to believe they will need more than average amounts of health care.
Given the low penetration rates under voluntary enrollment and, consequently, the small savings that the Medicaid program is likely to achieve if H M O enrollment is voluntary for Medicaid beneficiaries, mandatory enrollment in H M O s is likely to be increasingly considered by states in efforts to impose cost control. The issue o f freedom of choice for Medicaid beneficiaries under mandatory H M O enrollment, therefore, can be expected to become more salient.
We now proceed to a discussion o f the available data and what we can learn about freedom o f choice o f physicians and site o f care for Medicaid beneficiaries under mandatory H M O enrollment versus fee for service.
Measurement Issues and Data Limitations
It is important to note at the outset that the data are not available to do a rigorous econometric comparison o f physician availability to Medicaid beneficiaries under mandatory H M O enrollment versus Med icaid fee for service. The data do permit, however, a preliminary comparison which, although not quantitatively sophisticated, is cer tainly capable o f giving the correct order o f magnitude. Given the immediate policy importance of the issue in the face of the rapid growth in H M O enrollment in the general population, it is crucial, in our judgm ent, to find out as much as we can at this juncture.
Our measure of physician choice for HM Os under Medicaid is the percentage of physicians who are willing to include Medicaid patients in their practices, as measured by those who are certified to participate in the Medicaid program. In many cases, they are willing to accept some financial risk. (In Santa Barbara, the only available data were administrative records of physicians actually seeing patients.)
A weakness of this measure is that it does not necessarily reflect at least one medicaid beneficiary seen during the observation period. It also fails to differentiate between physicians who rarely see a Med icaid patient and those who see many (see for further discussion Hadley 1979; H eld, Holahan, and Carlson 1983) . N or does it take into account the fact that physicians may accept some of the Medicaid patients who come to them but refuse to see others (see Perloff, Kletke, and Neckerman 1987) . Still, it is adequate as a first approximation because it does measure the supply o f physicians who have shown willingness to take Medicaid patients. In the Arizona program, for example, 90 percent o f the physicians on their list are estimated to see Medicaid patients (personal communication Dorothy Lloyd, Ar izona Health Care Cost Containment System).
We restrict our focus to the participation of primary care physicians, because most initial contacts are with such physicians, and they are typically responsible, within the H M O system, for utilization deci sions and for continuity of care. It should be noted that in most programs M edicaid beneficiaries can switch primary physicians within an HM O every month and they can switch HM Os every year (more frequently for cause). Thus, a measure of participating physicians in the mandatory H M O sector does reflect ability to choose within that group.
Our methodology is to compare physician participation in areas with mandatory H M O enrollment for Medicaid beneficiaries with participation in traditional fee-for-service Medicaid in other parts of the same state where possible, and for the United States as a whole where state-specific fee-for-service Medicaid data are unavailable. Note that a conceptually preferable comparison would have been with feefor-service M edicaid in the same area before the introduction of man datory enrollment. The data were not available to do this. In par ticular, the largest mandatory H M O program is in Arizona, which had no M edicaid program before the introduction of mandatory enrollment.
D a ta on M a n d a to ry H M O s
We restrict our analysis to M edicaid H M O programs in which en rollment is mandatory and providers are placed at some financial risk. As argued above, without mandatory enrollment HMOs* market share is much smaller than otherwise, m aking an H M O policy much less attractive for M edicaid. W ithout being placed at risk, providers will not control costs. O f those programs that enroll at least 10,000 beneficiaries, we analyze the universe. Seven programs meet these criteria (see Freund and Neuschler 1986) , the basic characteristics o f which are presented in table 2. Arizona, by virtue of being statewide, is the largest. The programs in W isconsin and Philadelphia also have in excess o f 100,000 ben eficiaries. Three other programs are lim ited to one county. The Min nesota program includes a rural county, a suburban one, and a random sample of one-third of the beneficiaries in an urban county.
Three of the programs are lim ited to AFD C beneficiaries. Four programs involve all categorically M edicaid-eligible beneficiaries (that is, A FD C, aged, disabled, and blind beneficiaries). O f these, Arizona, Santa Barbara, and Philadelphia also include the medically needy. Medically needy are less often included because these people become eligible only upon " spending down" to a specified level of after-health care income. Thus, it is difficult to include them in HM Os because the financial risk of the H M O typically starts when the patient is already in the hospital.
Participation Although lack o f comparability due to border crossing is, in prin ciple, a problem with raw physician counts, it is at most a minor problem for our data. When disaggregated data were available, as was the case for Philadelphia, Minnesota, and Milwaukee, only phy sicians with clinics in the service area were counted as participating. For Santa Barbara, Kansas City, Monroe County, and Arizona, the state M edicaid agency supplied total figures. In Santa Barbara, Monroe County, and Arizona, however, the urbanized area, which includes most of the suburbs o f metropolitan areas, is a subcomponent of the county (or the state) (U .S. Bureau o f the Census 1982). This makes it unlikely that physicians from outside the county (or the state) would participate in the H M O program . In Kansas City, the urbanized area spills over into the adjacent county, but participating physicians were required to have an office in the county.
Physician participation in fee for service is usually measured as physicians who claim to have any Medicaid patients in their practice, and several analyses have used the N ational Opinion Research Center (N O RC ) Survey (e .g ., M itchell and Schurman 1984) . The use of survey data has the measurement problem that physician respondents overstate the proportion of the Medicaid patients actually in their practices. (K letke et al. [1985] indicate that, for pediatricians, the true figure is 4 0 percent below the reported one.) N O R C data are (Holahan 1984) . This reflects the feet that higher reimbursement rates increase fee-for-service participation (e .g ., Perloff, Kletke, and Neckerman 1986) . (Given that decreases in M edicaid fees decrease physician participation, one m ight infer that Medicaid beneficiary's access to physicians would suffer. However, Long, Settle, and Stuart [1986] demonstrated that lower fees merely shift care from physician offices to outpatient hospital departments, emergency rooms, and clinics.) W e will compare H M O physician participation rates to state-specific rates for California, New York, and Pennsylvania. The rates for M in nesota and W isconsin are combined because o f the states' proximity to each other and their sim ilar Medicaid physician fee schedules. For Missouri and Arizona the U nited States rate will be the baseline. The only H M O program s large enough to affect statewide rates are in Arizona, W isconsin, and Pennsylvania. Arizona will be compared to the national rate. The potential effect o f the other two programs on statewide rates does not concern us here, because the H M O programs began after the N O R C survey was conducted. Physician participation rates under mandatory H M O enrollment are presented in table 4. The programs with the lowest participation rates are Santa Barbara and Philadelphia. Both have rates o f about 40 percent, in contrast to 82 percent for fee for service in California and 70 percent in Pennsylvania. Both programs are H IO s rather than traditional H M O s (that is, the programs sign insurance contracts with individual physicians, who accept some financial risk). And neither has sought to maximize the number o f physicians participating. The Santa Barbara H IO originally planned to require that each partici pating physician have at least 125 patients, so that each physician's risk would be spread over a sizable number o f patients. (Given that Americans average one visit per quarter [W ilensky and Bernstein 1983] , 125 patients would translate into 125 visits per quarter, a magnitude larger than the 10 visits proposed by Hadley as the lower bound for a physician to be counted as "participating" in M edicaid.) Pressure from physicians with smaller Medicaid patient loads forced the H IO to drop this lim itation, however. This attem pt to exclude nominal participation (or even moderate levels of participation) dem onstrates that the agency did not consider a simple measure of par ticipation to be im portant for access. The Philadelphia H IO did not attempt to exclude nominal participants but does not push for higher physician participation in the recognition that fewer physicians make it easier to maintain quality assurance because physicians can be au dited more carefully (personal communication, Eileen Schoen, Office 
Site of Care
An alternative way to measure choice of physician and access involves the site o f care. The underlying idea is that quality of care for the poor is ensured if the poor receive their care at the same sites as the middle class. The only data we were able to obtain on site of care under mandatory M edicaid H M O enrollment is for Arizona. Even so, it is worth exploring the experience o f one state to get some indication of how one measure o f freedom of choice compares with another. Kletke, and Neckerman 1987) . In any case, the site of care distribution under mandatory H M O enrollment for Medicaid beneficiaries is closer to the visit distribution under private insurance than is traditional feefor-service Medicaid. By this measure, Arizona's mandatory HMO program has been somewhat more successful in mainstreaming its M edicaid population than other Medicaid programs.
Conclusion
This article has used available evidence to pursue the issue of freedom of choice under mandatory H M O enrollment for Medicaid benefici aries, using physician participation in Medicaid as our primary mea sure. The available data are inadequate to undertake rigorous econ ometric analysis; thus, the evidence allows for only very approximate estimates. For example, there are only seven programs of mandatory HM O enrollment for M edicaid beneficiaries. The data we used to measure H M O physician participation in Medicaid is not strictly comparable to the data we used to measure physician participation under M edicaid. Given these uncertainties, the degree o f freedom of choice under mandatory H M O enrollment seems to be related to general H M O penetration in the market area. In areas o f low HM O penetration, the physician participation rate under mandatory HM O enrollment is lower than under comparable fee for service Medicaid. As HM O enrollment rises, participation rates under mandatory en rollment rise. And, at H M O market shares above 25 percent, the physician participation rates under mandatory Medicaid enrollment and under fee for service are indistinguishable.
The reason for this seems to be the increasing prevalence of the IPA form o f H M O organization. Physicians affiliated with an IPA essentially have two doors to their office: one labeled fee for service and one labeled H M O . W hen IPAs predominate, as they do in W is consin and M innesota, mandatory H M O enrollment does not restrict Medicaid beneficiaries from entering that office; it only requires them to enter it through the H M O door.
Although we cannot incorporate it formally in our analysis, phy sician participation in Medicaid is influenced by policies other than mandatory H M O enrollment or fee for service. The generosity of payment has been consistently found to affect participation under fee for service (see Long, Settle, and Stuart 1986 , for a review o f this literature). It would be surprising if payment level were not a de terminant o f whether H M O s are willing to participate in Medicaid. Thus, states face a tradeoff between containing costs and encouraging provider participation regardless o f whether reimbursement is fee-forservice or capitation.
Physician participation is also affected by how Medicaid is admin istered. Under fee for service M edicaid, much paperwork and slow payment rates sometimes discourage participation. Under mandatory HM O enrollment, a number o f administrative devices can facilitate participation. For instance, a period o f guaranteed eligibility helps to stabilize enrollment in H M O s (Hurley 1986 ). Also, states can inform providers in a timely fashion o f beneficiaries who are enrolling or disenrolling. Finally, states, who m ust develop policies to assign beneficiaries who do not actively select a provider, can ensure that high-risk patients are evenly distributed across providers (Anderson and Fox 1987) . That payment levels and administrative procedures have influenced the participation rates presented above must be kept in mind.
The analysis o f this article m ight be boiled down to the following (oversimplified) conclusion: In areas where general H M O market share is large, mandatory H M O enrollment for Medicaid beneficiaries does not restrict freedom o f choice o f provider. Stating a conclusion baldly facilitates discussion of its lim itations. In this case, there are at least two categories of caveats. As stated immediately above, H M O s' will ingness to participate in Medicaid is determined, in part, by state policies such as M edicaid's payment rate. Thus, decisions regarding mandatory H M O enrollment and payment level should not be made separately. The second general caveat is that a physician's willingness to see a M edicaid beneficiary or whether at least one beneficiary was seen are minim al measures of participation. Physicians may see some beneficiaries but refuse to see others; they may encourage all Medicaid beneficiaries or discourage them. They may even be physically located away from most beneficiaries, such that their willingness to see ben eficiaries is largely irrelevant. And those that see beneficiaries may be of above or below average quality.
For the purposes of discussion, one could go a step further and state the following proposition: In areas where general HM O market share is large, mandatory H M O enrollment is a good policy. Although a complete discussion o f this proposition would require another article, one issue m ust be noted, namely quality o f care. Although PGPs such as Kaiser give their physicians little incentive to over-or un derprovide health care because they are on salary, many IP As give their physicians incentives to underprovide care in order to contain costs. Even though fee for service gives physicians the incentive to overprovide care (which may be harmful), many people are more concerned with quality in H M Os than in fee for service. Adding to this concern. Ware et al. (1986) found that Medicaid beneficiaries who were randomly assigned to an H M O (not an IPA) had more medical problems after a period of enrollment than those assigned to fee for service. The fee-for-service system used for the comparison in that study was more similar to private insurance than to Medicaid, but this result cannot be ignored.
Given these concerns, any mandatory H M O program should include a grievance procedure, the opportunity to disenroll for cause, and a strong quality-assurance program . Quality-assurance programs, which should include medical record audits, are operational in Arizona and W isconsin (Schaller, Bostrom , and Rafferty 1986; Schramm et al. 1986) . W ith such quality assurance, mandatory H M O enrollment programs could plausibly have greater quality than fee for service. The development o f quality-assurance programs should be a high priority for M edicaid H M O program s, and the analysis of qualityassurance program s should be a major focus of future research. 
